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Rising food prices have become a growing con-
cern globally and in southern Africa. In South 
Africa, where food availability is not an issue 
at present, the response has been to try to im-
prove access to food, mostly through the provi-
sion of grants and food aid (e.g. school feeding 
schemes). There is a lesser emphasis on widening 
the base of food production, since the dominant 
idea is that the existing system is able to meet 
food needs. This report widens the debate about 
food production and distribution in South Africa 
to consider some of the entrenched power dy-
namics that shape the way these happen, and to 
consider whether a more radical transformation 
of the agro-food system is required to ensure ad-
equate access to food for all.
A useful approach to considering food produc-
tion and distribution is the value chain approach 
pioneered by Gary Gereffi and others in the 
1990s. Value chain studies emphasise corporate 
strategies in structuring the flow of agro-food 
commodities. This has revealed a great deal 
about the way food is constructed as a com-
modity, and concentrated corporate power is a 
feature of agro-food commodity chains. But the 
agro-food system is not merely limited to corpo-
rate value chains. There has been little research 
on the remainder of the system, the ‘informal’ 
sector, ‘small-scale’ production and distribution 
whether for commercial purposes or not, and 
processing and distribution that wholly or par-
tially fall outside corporate structures. In part, 
this ‘remainder’ is tightly integrated into corpo-
rate value chains.
But what do we know of where and how that 
integration occurs, or what possibilities might 
emerge from non-integrated, non-corporate 
activities on food production and distribution? 
This requires empirical research. This report car-
ries out the more modest task of providing an 
initial outline of some potential areas for deeper 
consideration. It considers the structure of the 
South African agro-food system, and looks at 
points of possible intervention that could not 
only open the system to greater involvement by 
those who have been marginalised or passively 
incorporated into that system, but that also of-
fer potential pathways to structural change that 
could deepen diversity in the agro-food system 
and reorient it to the needs of the poor, both as 
historically subordinated producers and as con-
sumers.
Introduction    
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The commodity chain approach is useful in iden-
tifying key points of economic activity in agro-
food systems and the distribution of power. 
Gereffi (1994) identifies producer-driven chains 
which tend to be capital-intensive, and buyer-
driven chains which tend to be labour-intensive. 
‘Lead firms’ in dominant nodes control certain 
functions as a group that allow them to dictate 
the terms of participation by other actors in dif-
ferent functional positions in the value chain. 
Lead firms use their power to structure the chain 
in such a way that costs and risks (for themselves) 
are reduced, and speed and reliability of supply 
are increased (Gibbon 2000). In the past 30 or 40 
years, global food production and distribution 
have experienced increasing levels of corporate 
concentration. This was partially a consequence 
of key technological innovations such as can-
ning and freezing, mobile refrigeration (Fried-
land 1993) and, perhaps more fundamentally, 
information technologies that transformed re-
tail–supplier relations and enabled the establish-
ment of dedicated supply chains (Harris-Pascal 
et al. 1999; Jensen 2000). New technologies in 
seed production (first hybrids and then genetic 
modification) and the capital-intensive nature 
of agrochemical production concentrated own-
ership in input supply. Agricultural production 
remains the most diverse node in the food sys-
tem, with large numbers of producers, although 
large-scale industrial production is also strong. 
In South Africa, there is a wide base of agricul-
tural producers but value is almost entirely in 
the hands of a relatively small core of indus-
trial producers. Grain storage and trading, food 
processing and manufacturing and retail have 
all experienced corporate concentration global-
ly (ETC Group 2009). However, these processes 
of concentration do not take place evenly: they 
differ both geographically and across commod-
ity chains. Key aspects of difference between 
supply chains include institutions, functioning 
of markets and commodity characteristics (Swin-
nen 2007).
Agro-food systems, 
commodity chains and 
chain governance
Individual commodity chains are situated in 
broader agro-food systems that incorporate 
them and link them into other economic sectors 
or chains, sometimes quite closely: upstream 
to the mining-chemicals-energy complex, and 
downstream to the non-food retailing sector. In 
between are transport and logistics, and a range 
of financial and other services that bind agro-
food systems into the overall economy and the 
broader global economy. But the agro-food sys-
tem is more than the sum of individual commod-
ity chains. In South Africa, these links give agri-
culture a far greater role in the national econo-
my than its direct share of GDP would suggest. 
Agriculture’s contribution to gross value added 
was just 2.2% in 2009. However, agro-process-
ing’s share of national GDP and total manufac-
turing sales was 10% and 16.4% respectively in 
2009, making it the third largest manufacturing 
sector in South Africa. For every R1 million of 
agricultural production, an additional output of 
about R600 000 is generated in the rest of the 
economy. In [year], formal employment in agri-
culture was just 2% of national employment, but 
over 6 million people depend on agriculture for 
their livelihood – around 13% of the total popu-
lation (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries 2010: 7).
Commodity chain analysis tends to focus on the 
industrial–corporate production and distribu-
tion system and neglects to incorporate the base 
from which this grew, the pre-industrial systems 
of food provisioning that preceded it. Industrial 
technologies and ways of organising work do 
spread, resulting in a tendency for localised food 
systems ‘to become integrated into a more linear 
world system based on the principles of compar-
ative advantage, standardisation, geographical 
division of labour and control by a few large cor-
porations and trade agreements’.1 The emphasis 
here is on integration: localised, pre-industrial 
food systems were not entirely obliterated by in-
dustrial–corporate production and distribution 1 http://www.diversefoodsys-
tems.org/
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processes, but neither did they continue to exist 
as distinct, separate food systems in parallel with 
the ‘food regime of capital’ (Araghi 2003:51). 
They integrate unevenly in dynamic processes 
that produce poor alignments, contradictions 
and spaces for change. In general, agro-food sys-
tems do not conform well to industrial process-
es, and ‘pre-industrial production processes and 
agricultural products remain as enduring sources 
of competition, benchmarks of quality, and as 
culturally potent alternatives to the industrial 
paradigm’ (Goodman 1999:4). What goes for ag-
ricultural production also goes for input acquisi-
tion, processing or trading. Industrial production 
and distribution with a corporate institutional 
form – and the technologies and forms of work 
organisation they encompass – thus intersect 
with specific, unique contexts that mediate, 
shape and adapt in ongoing, dynamic processes 
of constitution.
The distribution of power in industrial commod-
ity chains is organisationally activated through 
chain governance. The rise of corporate concen-
tration in food commodity chains is inseparable 
from the breakdown of institutions of national 
co-ordination in the 1970s (McMichael 1994) and 
the consequent rise of private regulation. Private 
chain co-ordination rests on high concentrations 
of private economic power (Gibbon & Ponte 
2005). It does not merely replace the state, but 
alters the terms of governance and regulation to 
serve specific interests. In the agro-food system, 
these interests drive the ‘modernisation’ of food 
production, procurement and distribution. 
Broadly, regulation theory has something to of-
fer in understanding the ‘social structure of ac-
cumulation’ (Aglietta 1987; Gelb 1991) that envel-
ops a mode of production, and which changes as 
the society changes. This is the way that a whole 
society is structured and held together around 
notions of work organisation. Governance and 
regulation are central to the ongoing construc-
tion of this social structure and the forms of work 
it encompasses. This broader level of governance 
is replicated within specific commodity chains. 
There is a distinction between immediate forms 
of co-ordination (administration) and overall 
forms of governance (Gibbon & Ponte 2005). 
Administration is an important component of 
governance – making sure the system functions 
on a day-to-day level. However, overall govern-
ance is about negotiating the balance of power 
across the chain (or in the agro-food system as 
a whole) and ensuring that contradictions or 
tensions do not overwhelm the system. This is 
more open-ended than administration, and it is 
at this level that other social actors who are not 
involved in day-to-day administration can influ-
ence the structure, purpose and functioning of 
commodity chains.
The state and private sector play dominant roles 
in governance. These roles are not static and are 
constantly being negotiated. Private economic 
power is still mediated by the state in a dialecti-
cal relationship. Recent shifts in the conception 
of governance are emerging. Anarchic (market) 
or hierarchic (state or ‘imperative’) notions of 
governance are being replaced with heterarchic 
notions of governance, or ‘reflexive self-organ-
isation’ (Jessop 1998). This refers to a far more 
co-operative form of governance between state 
and private sector. Forms of heterarchic gov-
ernance include ‘self-organising interpersonal 
networks, negotiated inter-organisational co-
ordination, and decentred, context-mediated 
inter-systemic steering’ (Jessop 1998:29). The lat-
ter ‘involves the coordination of differentiated 
institutional orders or functional systems (such 
as the economic, political, legal, scientific, or 
educational systems), each of which has its own 
complex operational logic such that it is impos-
sible to exercise effective overall control of its 
development from outside that system’ (Jessop 
1998:30). The state plays a key role in ‘meta-gov-
ernance’, managing the respective roles of these 
different modes of co-ordination. The distribu-
tion of power, and hence governance arrange-
ments, differs from chain to chain. The distribu-
tion of power cannot therefore be worked out 
a priori, but requires context-specific, empirical 
investigation.
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The apartheid agro-food system grew out of 
a long series of laws and policies that shifted 
power towards white commodity producers and 
agribusinesses at the expense of all consumers. 
It was rooted in black land dispossession and 
suppression of black commercial activity, includ-
ing the almost total marginalisation of black 
agricultural production apart from some micro-
scale non-commercial activity. Governance was 
heavily reliant on overt state intervention and 
co-operative governance arrangements with 
white agrarian interests. The governance model 
tightly structured the relationships between ac-
tors in commodity chains and in the agro-food 
system as a whole in favour of white agricultural 
producers and agribusinesses. The boards were 
public–private partnerships, to speak in today’s 
parlance, statutory bodies but dominated by a 
range of private and quasi-private (the co-ops) 
interests. The co-ops were owned by their farm-
er members, but acted as proxies for the state. 
For example, they were appointed sole agents of 
the control boards for winter grains, deciduous 
fruit and citrus fruit (World Bank 1994). This al-
lowed the National Party to shore up and retain 
white agricultural interests as a core constitu-
ency (O’Meara 1996).
The regulatory structure created what appeared 
to be racialised urban–rural spatial dualism in 
the agro-food system. This was particularly pro-
nounced in the relegation of black farmers to 
the then homelands. However, the system was 
quite tightly integrated. It would be inaccu-
rate to talk about a divide between urban and 
rural food distribution systems, as Louw et al. 
(2007) do. Under apartheid, rural distribution 
to ‘white’ towns was merely an extension of the 
urban food distribution system. Millions of black 
farm dwellers on commercial farms were de-
pendent on these distribution systems for their 
food. Often the connection was indirect, and 
they were very adversely incorporated into the 
value chains, since they were price takers (sup-
pliers had more control over the price of food 
than buyers) and faced limited choice of prod-
uct. Agricultural commodity producers and proc-
essors sold to regional or local produce markets, 
general dealers and supermarkets. White farm-
ers bought in bulk and either provided food to 
black farm workers as part of their wage (‘pay-
ment in kind’), or resold to black inhabitants on 
the farms, sometimes at inflated prices. In the 
homelands, general dealers bought food sup-
plies through the same channels as retailers in 
the ‘whites-only’ areas did. Until price and mar-
keting deregulation in the 1980s, retailers were 
price takers in some key commodities.
One important pillar of the apartheid agro-food 
system was regulation of marketing and pric-
ing. This regulation was a continuation of the 
earlier regulatory framework stemming from 
the 1937 Marketing Act and other legislation 
that regulated marketing and price control over 
a wide range of products. More than 75% of 
agricultural products in South Africa were sold 
under controlled marketing schemes in 1990 
(World Bank 1994:61). These schemes included 
single-channel fixed-price schemes which legally 
obliged producers to sell their products through 
the scheme at fixed prices. This was applied to 
most grains, including maize and wheat. In sin-
gle-channel pool schemes, producers marketed 
their products through a board-administered 
pool and received advance payments on crops 
as well as deferred payments once all calcula-
tions were completed and costs deducted. Con-
tract farming operates very much on this model, 
but with a private company instead of a state 
entity managing the pool. Export crops fell into 
this category. Surplus removal schemes did not 
require mandatory sales to the scheme, but as-
sisted farmers by agreeing to buy any produce 
falling below a fixed minimum price. If the mini-
mum price was greater than the cost of produc-
tion, this would lead to overproduction as pro-
ducers could not lose. Until 1992, the dairy in-
dustry was an example of this type of scheme. In 
supervisory schemes, the board mediated price 
and contracting arrangements between buyers 
and producers (World Bank 1994). An important 
part of the regulatory framework was food price 
control. There were price controls on milk, but-
ter, cheese, bread, flour and maize meal (World 
Bank 1994). This ensured that food retailers were 
price takers in the maize, wheat and dairy chains, 
with limited power.
The apartheid agro-food 
system and its legacy
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These arrangements began losing coherence in 
the 1970s and this disintegration gathered pace 
in the 1980s as the apartheid state ran into polit-
ical and economic crisis. The state began reduc-
ing its own regulatory involvement in specific 
commodities as well as in the agro-food system 
as a whole. This opened the space for specific 
private white interests to step in and reorgan-
ise regulation in their own interests. This hap-
pened  in  uneven ways, benefiting larger pro-
ducers and agribusinesses in some commodities, 
for example sugar, fruit and wine (Bayley 2000). 
Indebted farmers who had relied on state sub-
sidies for their survival (up to 30% of all white 
farmers) were left exposed to market forces that 
were increasingly global as trade liberalisation 
also took effect. Laws were passed allowing 
for the privatisation of the white co-ops, which 
permitted white agriculture to reposition itself 
and privately appropriate the congealed value 
of decades of state support and monopoly con-
trol over entire nodes in value chains (Bernstein 
1996). The ending of the single-channel and oth-
er regulated marketing systems caused a desta-
bilisation of quality controls, and led to private 
regulation to ensure reliable supplies of produce 
of the required quality, with intensive private 
supervision and control of production processes 
(Swinnen 2007).
The restructuring of the apartheid agro-food 
system sharply altered the balance of power 
towards corporate retailers and brand owners 
and away from agricultural producers. It led to 
increased concentration throughout the agro-
food system, even though in some commodity 
chains and some nodes the number of entrants 
increased. This was particularly so in marketing, 
which in many commodity chains had previ-
ously been a monopoly. The restructuring left 
consumers exposed as food price controls were 
abolished. This was justified on the basis that 
deregulation would remove the price distortions 
characterising the apartheid regulatory system, 
and eliminate the favouritism of producers over 
consumers. Theoretically, this would reduce con-
sumer prices by removing incentives for ineffi-
cient production, and increasing competition. In 
practice, real food prices increased at the end of 
the 1980s and flattened out after reaching high-
er levels for most of the 1990s (Bayley 2000). Per 
capita consumption of maize, wheat and vegeta-
bles was lower in 2008 than it had been in 1985 
(National Department of Agriculture 2009:107). 
At the same time, price volatility increased 
sharply, exacerbated by trade liberalisation and 
the fluctuating fortunes of the currency.
Corporate retail penetrated to some extent into 
homeland and township areas, mostly after 
2000, especially around conglomerations of eco-
nomic and social activity, like the larger towns 
(Bienabe & Vermeulen 2007). Distribution tribu-
taries penetrated deep into the rural areas, al-
though costs of transporting food products were 
higher. The corporatised formerly white co-ops 
also expanded their reach into the homelands, 
providing services on both sides of agricultural 
production: input supply to farmers, and milling 
and storage downstream. The overall result was 
the consolidation of a corporate core and some 
restructuring of food value chains to integrate 
previously racially bifurcated agricultural pro-
duction, distribution and retailing along corpo-
rate lines.
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Key agro-food commodity chains in South Af-
rica are maize, poultry, cattle, deciduous and 
citrus fruit (significant export), milk, vegetables, 
wheat and sugar cane (significant export). Maize 
is a key product in the South African agro-food 
system. It is the staple food for the majority of 
the population and is the basis of animal feed. 
As such, it drives meat, dairy and egg prices as 
well (Moola 2010). This paper emphasises fresh 
produce because it has attracted the most schol-
arly attention, and because it is intimately linked 
with the consolidation of corporate retailing.
Retail
South Africa has experienced a rapid rise in cor-
porate food retail power in the past few decades, 
spurred by deregulation and fitting into broad-
er global processes of retail concentration since 
the 1980s (DFID 2004; Weatherspoon & Rear-
don 2003). The supermarket sector as a whole 
controlled about 55% of national food retail in 
the early part of that decade (Weatherspoon & 
Reardon 2003:1). Between 2008 and 2010, formal 
retail’s share of the food market increased from 
62% to 68% (Planting 2010: 34). Six retail chains 
(Shoprite, Pick n Pay, Spar, Massmart, Metcash 
and Woolworths) dominate the corporate food 
retail sector, controlling over 94% of the grocery 
market between them. The top two, Shoprite 
and Pick n Pay, held an estimated 47.6% market 
share between them in 2007,2 with a combined 
turnover of R61.7 billion (Competition Commis-
sion 2008:29). From 1999–2006, overall corporate 
supermarket store numbers grew by 38% (Louw 
et al. 2007:24). The South African food retail 
sector has been characterised as ‘an extremely 
tight oligopoly’ (Botha & van Schalkwyk, cited in 
Louw et al. 2007:19).
No longer constrained by racially based limits to 
the location of supermarkets, and spurred by the 
growth of a black middle class, there has been 
recent movement into the urban townships and 
the towns in the former homelands. Spar is lead-
ing this charge. Pick n Pay’s merger with Boxer 
in 2002 gave it a footprint in rural retail target-
ing the LSM1–4 market.3 In 2010 there were 92 
Boxer supermarkets countrywide.4 Franchising is 
an important aspect of this corporate expansion. 
Spar is ‘a collection of independently owned 
stores united by a common supplier and brand 
manager’ (Bleby 2010c:14), which allows individ-
ual retail entrepreneurs access to a brand and a 
supply network while still retaining ownership 
and some level of control over business strategy. 
Franchising is not limited to Spar, even though 
this supermarket chain is the most prominent in 
rural towns. Around 45% of Pick n Pay’s food 
stores are franchises.5 Eighteen-and-a-half per-
cent of Shoprite’s South African stores are fran-
chises (Bleby 2010c: 14). This corporate expansion 
is resulting in the crowding out of ‘informal’ and 
small retailers (Louw et al. 2007).
The remaining 32–45%6 of the food market 
lies outside the corporate sector. This includes 
the ‘informal’ trading sector, incorporating all 
sizes from some small general dealers to spaza 
shops to roadside vendors, as well as govern-
ment procurement. These markets are ‘inher-
ently tied to lower costs of food, local sourcing 
of produce and, at times, quicker transportation 
within the network or supply chain,…bring[ing] 
the retail outlet closer to the…resident, and 
thus creat[ing] a more effective food supply 
mechanism’ (Abrahams 2010:130). ‘The poor’ 
tend to have similar shopping patterns around 
the world. ‘They buy low value-added goods, in 
small units, with minimal processing and packag-
ing. They lack easy access to transportation and 
hence tend to make most of their food expen-
ditures within walking distances of their homes 
or work’ (Jayne 2008:129). Per unit prices tend 
to be higher for smaller units, raising the cost 
of food for poorer consumers. This means that 
roadside stalls and small kiosks (spaza shops) are 
important outlets for food distribution. In some 
places, fragmented ‘informal’ markets have con-
solidated to form larger wholesale markets, and 
have commercialised in response to the entry 
of supermarkets (Abrahams 2010). Distribution 
The distribution of power 
in agro-food value chains in 
South Africa
2  http://www.fastmoving.
co.za/retailers/pick-n-pay
3  The LSM bands are income 
categories for the population, 
with 1 being the lowest and 10 
being the highest.
4  http://www.picknpay-ir.
co.za/financials/annual_re-
ports/2010/group-profile.html
5  http://www.picknpay-ir.co.za/
financials/annual_reports/2010/
group-profile.html
6  'The remainder of Weath-
erspoon and Reardon’s 55% 
estimate  and Planting’s 68% 
indication for the share of 
formal sector in the first para-
graph of this section.'
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to government institutions and programmes, 
such as hospitals, the military or school feeding 
schemes, is potentially important as a channel 
for food distribution. This is completely under-
researched, but presents an opportunity for 
public action in procurement and distribution 
that is already under the control of the public 
sector but not systematically integrated into or 
aligned with black agricultural producer or ‘in-
formal sector’ policies.7 Although as a percent-
age of gross turnover non-corporate actors’ 
share of food trading is lower in value than that 
of corporate retailers, they still serve as distribu-
tion outlets for millions of people, even if mostly 
as an adjunct to the corporate retailers. Apart 
from the large numbers of people that receive 
services from ‘informal’ traders, for many people 
trading activities constitute their only form of in-
come (Murray 2008; Tomlinson & Larsen 2003). 
To date, little consideration has been given to 
potential interventions that seek to strengthen 
non-corporate trading – whether through bet-
ter integration with industrial–corporate value 
chains or as part of other non-corporate systems 
of production and distribution, or some combi-
nation of those.
There is a dominant, normative idea that food 
systems will ‘naturally’ evolve towards super-
markets, and consequently the demise of infor-
mal retail is a ‘necessary progression’ towards 
modern retail chains (Abrahams 2010:119, 122). 
The notion of a ‘modern’, ‘formal’ food retail 
sector is constructed on the basis of taking chain 
supermarkets as the norm, and then designing 
a regulatory framework based on the contracts 
and standards they require. The difficulties with 
combining the ‘formal’ supermarket and ‘infor-
mal’ trading sectors stem from the difficulties 
in applying the regulatory framework of the 
former to encompass the latter. For commercial 
agricultural producers, the ‘informal’ trading 
sector is a dumping ground for lower-grade pro-
duce, although these traders also buy high-qual-
ity produce for similar prices as supermarkets 
(Bienabe & Vermeulen 2007). ‘Informal’ is here 
equated with inferiority, or being unequipped 
to interact systematically with corporate food 
chains. This ‘failure’ belongs not only to the 
character of non-corporate trading, but also to 
the bias of the regulatory system itself. In spite 
of this, SMME (small, medium and micro enter-
prises) and development policy tend to assume 
that the task is to get non-corporate traders to 
conform to corporate standards, rather than to 
create more flexible and locally appropriate sys-
tems of intermediation.
The growing dominance of supermarkets in food 
retail is not a ‘natural’ development driven by 
abstract laws of economic change: in many cases, 
the success of supermarkets and the dwindling 
of other retail spaces resulted ‘from the removal 
of funding from state storage facilities and pub-
lic distribution centres, and attempts to quash 
the informal economy’ (Abrahams 2010:122). In 
the urban areas, state attempts to control the 
‘informal’ trading sector have focused on con-
solidating geographical location and deploy-
ing health by-laws to prevent the unregulated 
spread of food trading in the city streets. This 
eliminates locational advantages for some trad-
ers and increases competition between vendors 
by centralising the locations at which trading is 
permitted. Attempts to formalise these traders 
were accompanied by efforts to convert them 
into rent-paying businesses, efforts which were 
actively resisted by many (Gotz & Simone 2003; 
Murray 2008). Although the growth of super-
markets certainly has an important impact on 
the agro-food system, this is not the only driver 
of change in the system. Change is also driven 
by local institutional, technical and demographic 
change, and by history. This means there is ‘no 
deterministic “future of smallholder farms” or 
food systems’ outside of practical action, strong-
ly driven by government policy and investment 
(Jayne 2008:109–10). 
End consumers are very weak in the agro-food 
system as a whole. Power is fragmented among 
atomised consumers who generally have to ac-
cept the range of prices and quality offered 
to them. A small layer of consumers with the 
purchasing power to demand better quality or 
particular ecological farming practices has been 
segregated into a premium tier. Retailers have 
created tiered markets with sometimes very fine 
gradations between market segments. For exam-
ple, maize meal is graded into unsifted, sifted, 
special and super categories, each targeted at 
a segment of the market (National Agricultural 
Marketing Council 2003). Corporate retailers de-
fine these market segments based on LSM bands. 
Most of the corporate retailers have developed 
distinct brands for different market tiers: Sho-
prite has Usave for the lowest tiers; Hungry 
Lion, Shoprite and OK for the middle tiers; and 
House and Home and Checkers/Hyper for the up-
per tiers. Pick n Pay has Boxer for the lower and 
middle tiers and Pick n Pay for the upper tiers. 
7  This point arose in informal dis-
cussion with Milla McLaughlin and 
others during the Learning Journey 
to Limpopo as part of the Southern 
Africa Food Security Change Lab.
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Woolworths is the only major food retailer that 
exclusively targets the upper tiers of the market. 
Franchising is also used to differentiate markets. 
Both Pick n Pay and Spar franchises target lower 
market tiers. Spar separates its stores into cor-
porate and franchise divisions. Even though the 
store brands target different market tiers, re-
tailers may retain some mix of mass market and 
high-value products within individual stores. 
This tiering of markets has implications for sourc-
ing and supply chain co-ordination, especially in 
fresh produce. For the purposes of immediate 
intervention points, fresh produce value chains 
are probably the most important to consider, 
since processed goods (as will be seen below) are 
almost entirely dominated by corporate produc-
ers. In contrast, there is a potentially strong base 
of fresh produce growers. In the case of Spar, for 
example, corporate stores must procure all their 
fresh produce via the retailers’ national distri-
bution centre. But franchise stores have slightly 
more flexibility, and are permitted to procure up 
to 10% of their total fresh produce from other 
sources. This opens the door for subordinated 
smallholder producers to get directly into local 
supermarkets, especially in former homeland 
and small town franchises (Bienabe & Vermeu-
len 2007).
Sourcing from organic or small-scale producers is 
often used as part of the branding effort in the 
form of corporate social investment (CSI) and 
‘community involvement strategies’ (Bienabe & 
Vermeulen 2007). It is used as a brand tool that 
captures non-price notions of quality (for exam-
ple, sustainable production techniques) that are 
then factored into the price. The emphasis of 
this type of CSI is on production methods with 
perceived ecological or environmental benefits 
(organic farming, water saving), with an added 
emphasis on the production process. However, 
working conditions along the chain are appar-
ently of less concern to consumers, as expressed 
through the branding of products. While Wool-
worths has a campaign around the transition 
to organic or ecological farming, there is little 
if any reference to working conditions and pay-
ment for farm workers, or other workers along 
the value chain. An underlying feature of CSI is 
that it is an entirely corporate-driven project; it 
is carried out in the interests of corporate prof-
itability. The model of social inclusion is entre-
preneurship. CSI reinforces corporate control by 
aligning ‘community’ initiatives with corporate 
strategies in the agro-food system.
The premium food tier is not entirely separate 
from the mass market, and over time innova-
tions and quality may become ‘massified’ and 
spread throughout the food distribution system. 
Although this has potentially positive aspects, 
for example higher productivity, lower prices, 
greater access to food and improved food qual-
ity, the criteria on which quality is based are not 
to be taken at face value. The ‘flight to quality’ 
by middle- and high-income consumers in the 
United States and Europe increased rapidly fol-
lowing a series of food-related scares (for exam-
ple, BSE or mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth 
disease, H1N1, ‘swine flu’) that undermined 
trust in mass-produced ‘placeless’ and ‘faceless’ 
foods. These consumers could afford to seek al-
ternative provisioning by demanding greater ac-
countability in the food chain (Goodman 2009). 
Because of their purchasing power, these alter-
natives were absorbed into the mainstream, for 
example through organic lines in supermarkets. 
In the context of overproduction of agricultural 
commodities and corporate concentration and 
competition in retail, retailers sought to differ-
entiate what they were selling on the basis of 
‘quality’. Although all consumers would prefer 
better-quality food, control over the meanings 
of quality allows retailers to segment the mar-
ket. The cultural meanings of quality are thus 
captured and translated into economic rent by 
those able to control these meanings (Goodman 
2009).
Adherence to safety standards is one of the ways 
quality is defined. In South Africa, government 
regulation sets the baseline for considerations 
of food standards, essentially requiring that pro-
duce must be fit for human consumption (Louw 
et al. 2007). This is the case throughout the agro-
food system. However, the state has a limited 
ability to monitor and enforce compliance, and 
corporate retailers have stepped into the gap 
to enforce compliance not only with the mini-
mum standards but also with additional stand-
ards that they determine. So, for example, most 
major retailers now require EurepGAP standards 
at farm level and HACCP (Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point) at pack-house/process-
ing level from fresh produce suppliers (Bienabe 
& Vermeulen 2007). Under the umbrella of the 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), seven major 
South African retailers have come to a common 
acceptance of the four GFSI benchmarked food 
safety schemes: the British Retail Consortium 
Global Food Standard; the International Food 
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Standard; the Safe Quality Food Scheme (2000); 
and the Dutch HACCP Scheme (Option B). The In-
ternational Committee of Food Retail Chains co-
ordinates the GFSI (Popplewell 2009), showing 
greater international corporate co-ordination of 
standards. These standards raise barriers to en-
try for smaller producers because of the costs of 
compliance, and the need for economies of scale 
in monitoring and compliance in traceability and 
certification schemes.
Even then, the standards apply only to those 
who are able to meet corporate retailer require-
ments. Retailers have the power to enforce these 
rules, while the state lacks the same power to 
enforce even the minimum standards in the rest 
of the agro-food system. This generates a self-
fulfilling prophecy, where food quality, safety 
standards and co-ordination capacity improve 
in the corporate chains while the ‘unregulated’ 
parts of the chain are left with variable quality 
and weakening governance systems as capacity 
is drawn into the corporate chains. This uneven 
distribution of power allows corporate retailers 
to make more inroads into the informal sector 
(Bienabe & Vermeulen 2007). This is not just a 
product of the idea of ‘quality’, but also the 
practical reality of improved value in consumers’ 
own estimation.
Michael Pollan (2008) describes the significant 
negative health (and social) effects of the ‘indus-
trialisation of eating’, which includes a simplifi-
cation of food content and a move away from 
food culture to food science. The dominance of 
supermarkets embodies a shift to an industrial-
ised food system, with ambiguous consequences 
for dietary quality – for example, a shift from 
a diet rich in a variety of foodstuffs (legumes, 
sorghum) to a simplified diet highly reliant on 
(poor quality) meat for protein and (nutrition-
ally limited) maize for starch.
While industrial–corporate food production and 
distribution produces innovations and efficien-
cies that may be beneficial for consumers, the 
types of innovation and efficiency are bound up 
with attempts to create and capture added val-
ue. For example, information, design, branding, 
retailing, marketing and lending for consump-
tion have become significant sources of value ad-
dition (Gibbon & Ponte 2005). These constitute 
barriers to entry which are used by lead agents 
to appropriate value in the chain (Gereffi 1999).
Wholesale and supply
Wholesale and supply refers to the procurement 
of fresh and processed food products from pro-
ducers and their distribution to retailers and 
their individual stores. There is an overlap be-
tween processors and wholesalers. In the past, 
retailers relied on the producers (whether farm-
ers or food manufacturers) to organise distribu-
tion. Over time, ‘intermediaries’ in the form of 
brokers stepped in to source products and sup-
ply retailers, resulting in some degree of consoli-
dation and the creation of a ‘first tier’ of suppli-
ers. An important source of fresh produce was 
the municipal fresh produce markets. Although 
retail stores tended to contract directly with pro-
ducers, brokers relied heavily on the fresh pro-
duce markets. Farmers paid a 5% fee on sales 
to the municipalities for upkeep, administration 
and expansion of the markets. South Africa has 
17 national fresh produce markets (NFPMs), with 
turnover concentrated in the big cities. Johan-
nesburg, Tshwane, Cape Town and Durban re-
cently held a 75% share of total NFPM turnover 
value (Louw et al. 2007:15). The produce markets’ 
price-setting mechanism was and remains the 
benchmark for fresh produce marketed through 
other channels (Louw et al. 2007). These markets 
had credit facilities between agents and buyers, 
but they were open to abuse and the National 
Agricultural Marketing Council (2007) recom-
mended that they be terminated.
The revolutionising of retail procurement logis-
tics technology and inventory management dra-
matically reduced costs. This allowed corporate 
retail to expand into mass markets which in turn 
drove changes in procurement systems (Reardon 
et al. 2005). With the growth of supermarkets, 
the ability to handle large quantities of higher-
quality produce and to distribute it ‘just in time’ 
to individual stores on request increased in im-
portance. Supermarkets struggled to meet these 
goals through traditional procurement methods 
and channels, leading to four key pillars of a 
new procurement system: i) the use of dedicat-
ed procurement agents; ii) the use of preferred 
suppliers; iii) centralised procurement through 
distribution centres; and iv) the imposition of 
quality standards on suppliers and agricultural 
producers (Reardon 2006).
On this basis, dedicated procurement agents spe-
cialising in specific products and serving the su-
permarkets as their main clients are increasingly 
Contesting the food system in South Africa
10
preferred over traditional brokers and spot mar-
kets. They cut co-ordination and enforcement 
costs, and enforce private standards and con-
tracts on behalf of the supermarkets (Reardon et 
al. 2005). In some cases this is done in-house, for 
example with the specialist sourcing companies 
Freshline (Spar) and Freshmark (Shoprite). But in 
other cases procurement is outsourced to dedi-
cated wholesalers, with retailers using only one 
or two suppliers per category of product (Louw 
et al. 2007). Suppliers able to meet the retailers’ 
product and delivery specifications and prices 
are listed to the exclusion of others (Mather & 
Kenny 2005). In recent years, retail procurement 
from NFPMs has declined to as little as 10% of 
total procurement, ‘relating to lack of cold chain 
maintenance, inadequate traceability to the 
farm level and food safety issues’ (Bienabe & 
Vermeulen 2007:3). 
Centralised distribution centres under control of 
the retailers are short-term holding centres for 
rapid distribution of products following store 
orders. They have varying degrees of independ-
ence from retailers, but are mostly closely inte-
grated with the retailing function (Louw et al. 
2007). Suppliers are now regularly required to 
pay distribution allowances to the retailers, who 
then take up the distribution function for them-
selves (Bleby 2010d). Centralisation reduces co-
ordination and other transaction costs, although 
it may increase transport costs, which are shifted 
onto suppliers (Reardon et al. 2005). Centrali-
sation gives retailers more leverage because 
of their own economies of scale, which allows 
them to use distribution services as part of their 
entire business model, not purely for the agro-
food chain. They can undercut smaller entities 
that are not tied into a larger corporate struc-
ture. This prompts consolidation in the supplier 
and retailer sectors through acquisition and con-
glomeration of smaller business units.
Changes in procurement are leading to concen-
tration in procurement/supply, and are hasten-
ing integration between retailers and suppliers 
(Bleby 2010d). The extent to which retailers are 
gaining power in the chain as a result is disput-
ed. There is evidence that retailers use the new 
procurement systems to extract greater value 
from suppliers, and transfer costs to them. Re-
tailers squeeze suppliers through regularly ne-
gotiated discounts and rebates, charging sup-
pliers extra for promotions, returning unsold 
products, delaying payment (a practice that has 
become a source of  profit in its own right) and 
using own label branding to undercut processors 
(Mather 2005; Mather & Kenny 2005). In its glo-
bal operations, Wal-Mart ‘has consistently asked 
its vendors to lay out a plan that reduces costs 
by 10–12% a year, looking at the total system, 
not just within the (supplier) itself’ – through a 
combination of sharing cost cuts, but also open-
ing suppliers’ businesses to scrutiny by a cor-
poration (although they haven’t been able to 
achieve this target to date in their supply chains) 
(Bleby 2010d: 11). However, according to Pick n 
Pay chairman Raymond Ackerman, retailers are 
not always entirely dominant in their relations 
with suppliers: ‘For many of us, a very large 
percentage of all goods is sourced from a small 
number of large companies, most of them mul-
tinationals’ (quoted in Bleby 2010b: 1). There is 
some evidence of multinational involvement in 
wholesaling, for example fruit exporters also 
procuring and selling into the local market to 
diversify their risk (Louw et al. 2007). Wal-Mart, 
rumoured to be on the verge of entering the 
South African market, has a supplier base in Stel-
lenbosch, where it sources fresh produce for its 
global operations (Bleby 2010c).
Traceability and product segregation are core 
governance mechanisms that enable retailers 
to monitor a product from input supply to final 
consumer and to maintain control over quality 
(African Centre for Biosafety 2010). This includes 
not only suppliers, but also processors, primary 
producers and even input suppliers. For example, 
preferred supplier schemes ‘always include regu-
lar engagement with farmers based on techni-
cal advice, training and specification’ (Bienabe 
& Vermeulen 2007:3). There is a similar relation-
ship between selected producers and retailers 
as there is between suppliers and retailers, with 
the selected producers' business activities be-
ing opened to increasing scrutiny by retailers. In 
Woolworths’ Farming for the Future initiative, 
although the retailer does not prescribe pre-
cisely how to farm, ‘what we want to know is 
the thinking behind their decision[s]…Why did 
they spray, at that time, in those crops, in that 
area? Did they take into account negative ef-
fects on the environment, and did the decision 
prove justified after they had done so?’ (Kobus 
Pienaar, quoted in Sherry 2010b: 52). Decisions 
about which agrochemicals are used, or whether 
genetically modified (GM) seed is used, are also 
based on the private standards set by retailers. 
This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
it has the potential to encourage socially and ec-
ologically sustainable farming practices. On the 
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other hand, only selected producers are involved 
and it forces them to make investments on the 
basis of standards determined by corporate re-
tailers. It widens the gap between those who are 
able to meet the standards and the costs asso-
ciated with this and those who are not able to 
do so, based on technical definitions of quality 
standards.
Storage and processing
Storage, in particular of bulk durable commodi-
ties like grains, was historically the preserve of 
the co-ops. The corporatisation and conversion 
of the co-ops into private companies has resulted 
in the consolidation and concentration of stor-
age facilities.8 Afgri, Senwes and Noordwes, all 
regionally based former co-operatives, dominate 
storage in the grain value chain, holding 70% of 
domestic storage facilities between them. There 
are 220 depots on the Highveld, accounting for 
around 83% of capacity, and 46 in the Western 
Cape which account for less than 6% of total ca-
pacity (National Agricultural Marketing Council 
2003:148; National Department of Agriculture 
2006c). Profits of the three former co-ops were 
considered to be well above average rates for 
the industry in 2002 (Chabane 2002). Senwes and 
Afgri also accounted for more than 30% of grain 
traded in 2003/4, indicating a strong crossover 
between storage and trading. There are just four 
major grain traders on the South African Futures 
Exchange (Competition Commission 2008:29). 
The Competition Commission has suspicions that 
silo owners are using their economic strength to 
engage in unfair competition. In March 2010, the 
Commission announced an investigation into Af-
gri, Senwes, NWK, OVK, Suidwes, VKB and the 
Grain Silo Industry on possible collusion in set-
ting silo tariffs (Senwes 2010). New technologies 
for on-farm storage, like silo bags, are making 
small inroads into storage. But given the link be-
tween corporate storage and processing and the 
economies of scale that make it impossible for 
processors to accept grain from individual farm-
ers and pool it, adoption of these technologies 
will be limited to short-term on-farm storage. 
Even agricultural producers who are not produc-
ing for the market tend to take their produce 
to the corporate millers for milling and storage. 
They then collect the milled grain as and when 
they need it.
About 70% of agricultural output is used as in-
termediate products in manufacturing and re-
lated sectors (Louw et al. 2007:4). There were 
more than 2 200 companies involved in food and 
beverage manufacturing in 2003 (Vermeulen et 
al. 2008:200). But the food and food products 
sector is one of the most concentrated sectors 
in South African manufacturing. Between 1975 
and 1996, the contribution to output of the top 
5% of firms increased from 65% to 75%. The top 
15% of firms had 90% of output in 1996 (Louw 
et al. 2007:14). A few large corporations domi-
nate the South African food industry: National 
Brands, Pioneer Foods, Tiger Brands, Nestle SA. 
This concentration is a historical consequence of 
restricted licensing procedures and – in sectors 
not under the control of the boards – techni-
cal barriers to entry that limited the number of 
processors under the segregationist apartheid 
era (Mather 2005). Nevertheless, this concentra-
tion varies from commodity to commodity. In the 
1990s, concentration was the highest in break-
fast foods, starches and starch products; dairy 
products; and coffee, coffee substitutes and tea, 
where the top four companies held over 80% of 
the market share. On the other end of the spec-
trum, the top four companies in the meat, fish, 
fruit, vegetables, oils and fats categories had less 
than 20% market share (Mather 2005:611).
Deregulation and market liberalisation had con-
tradictory effects. On the one hand, the number 
of food manufacturing companies increased 
(although unevenly and not in all sectors). On 
the other hand, the share of the market held by 
the major processors also increased as a result 
of mergers and acquisitions. In the grain mill-
ing sector, for example, while there are more 
than 190 maize millers (National Department of 
Agriculture 2006c:16), four firms control 73% of 
maize milling output (Cutts & Kirsten 2006:328). 
The dairy sector has seen both a decline in the 
number of primary producers and producer–
distributors and an increase in the average size 
of dairy farms, processors and retailers since de-
regulation (Food Pricing Monitoring Committee 
2004). The top five processors control 70% of 
fresh milk production (Mather & Kenny 2005:181). 
The top three poultry feed producers – Afgri, 
Epol and Meadow – control 75% of the market 
between them (National Agricultural Marketing 
Council & Commark Trust 2007:3). The list goes 
on. Focusing on individual commodities may 
lead one to underestimate the ownership and 
market share of conglomerates like Tiger Brands 
and Pioneer Foods, which operate and are domi-
nant in more than one commodity chain.
8  Information in this paragraph 
was drawn from African Centre for 
Biosafety (2010).
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Corporate food processors have used their mar-
ket power to make windfall profits during pe-
riods of sharp food price hikes. According to 
economist Nazmeera Moola (2010: 12), Tiger 
Brands’ grain division’s second-half earnings in 
2009 were up 45% ‘due not to any particular 
management expertise but to its ability to keep 
prices high while inputs costs fell’. Integrated 
companies in both storage and processing are 
known to sell at higher prices to competitors in 
downstream activities. Mather (2005) indicates 
how small poultry processors felt they were not 
paying ‘market prices’ for feed because the larg-
est broiler companies are also involved in feed 
manufacturing. In 2009, the Competition Tribu-
nal found that Senwes was engaged in unfair 
pricing policies for storage that discouraged 
farmers from selling to traders competing with 
the Senwes trading arm (Competition Appeal 
Court 2009).
Foreign direct investment in processing since 
the 1990s has intensified competitive pressures 
in food processing and increased barriers to en-
try (Bayley 2000). Rising food imports are also 
a challenge to the sector, both for raw materi-
als and processed products, allowing retailers to 
bypass local producers with goods that are often 
subsidised in their home countries. In the to-
mato subsector, for example, local producers are 
in direct competition with Chinese producers. In 
2006, it cost Giant Foods in Limpopo just R250/
ton to import tomatoes from China, compared 
with R750/ton paid to an existing network of lo-
cal producers (Louw et al. 2007:47). Overall, the 
value of imported processed food products rose 
more than 6.5 times between 1995 and 2007, 
from R2.7 billion to R18.1 billion. Unprocessed 
food products also rose, though not as sharply, 
from R5.4 billion in 1995 to R12.5 billion in 2007 
(National Department of Agriculture 2009:84). 
The value of processed imports has overtaken 
the value of processed exports; the balance of 
trade for processed goods is negative and declin-
ing (Sherry 2009).
As in retail, a focus on corporate processors tends 
to lead to less attention being paid to ‘non-cor-
porate’ food processors. A small survey of small-
scale processors found that more than 85% of 
the processors sold their products to independ-
ent (non-corporate) retailers (Mather 2005:613). 
Their inability to sell to corporate supermarkets 
is based on their inability to meet the volume 
and consistency of supply required by these re-
tailers. However, the availability of other retail-
ers and traders outside the corporate system 
means that the smaller processors may still have 
an outlet. There is potential to build these links. 
No detailed research on ‘informal’ food process-
ing has been carried out in South Africa. Dav-
ies and Thurlow (2009:14) found that ‘informal’ 
food and beverage manufacturing constituted 
just 1.5% of national GDP from this sector, and 
6.4% of employment in this sector, but still con-
sidered it a key informal manufacturing sector. 
According to Vink and van Rooyen (2009:18), 
an estimated 30% of the national maize crop is 
now milled by small-scale millers. Informal sector 
slaughtering of red meat and sale to end con-
sumers either in raw or cooked form now forms 
‘a substantial proportion of total red meat sales’ 
(Vink & van Rooyen 2009:18), although its precise 
magnitude is unknown. There has been a rapid 
increase in the number of small abattoirs that re-
tail directly or sell direct to retailers, resulting in 
a crisis for the large-scale metropolitan abattoirs 
(Vink & van Rooyen 2009). In other African coun-
tries, a high portion of food expenditure in the 
poorest households is on street food and ready-
prepared meals (Bricas & Broutin 2008). If we 
include home preparation of raw produce, and 
street vendors preparing and selling food, ‘non-
corporate’ processing may encompass a relative-
ly important part of food production. Processing 
doesn’t have to be an industrial activity. If we 
think of the staple foods for the majority of the 
population – maize meal, vegetables and some 
meat (poultry or beef) – the requirements for in-
dustrial processing are not high. The key issue in 
these chains is the distribution of primary prod-
ucts from the agricultural producer.
Agricultural production
There is a missing middle in agricultural produc-
tion in South Africa (Hall 2009). On the one side 
are approximately 40 000 large-scale, capital-in-
tensive, mostly white commercial producers with 
established links to domestic and export corpo-
rate supply chains. On the other side are an es-
timated 1.3 million small-scale, labour-intensive, 
mostly black producers. They range from people 
producing food purely for household consump-
tion to people producing agricultural commodi-
ties primarily for markets, with many mixing 
the two either through sale of surpluses after 
household use is taken care of, or through the 
production of food crops for household use and 
cash crops on the side for sale. Cousins (2009) 
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proposes that general reference to smallholders 
provides an insufficient basis for understand-
ing the differentiation that exists among small-
scale agricultural producers. He identifies six key 
categories which permit nuanced interventions 
in support of smallholder agriculture. The cat-
egories are supplementary food producers and 
allotment-holding wage workers, both of whom 
engage in some food production for household 
consumption with differing access to wage la-
bour; worker-peasants who combine substantial 
agricultural production with wage labour; petty 
commodity producers for whom farming is the 
main source of income and who rely on a com-
bination of own, family and hired labour; small-
scale capitalist farmers who hire labour; and 
capitalists who farm but whose main income 
comes from elsewhere. It should be recognised 
that most of these categories are integrated 
into capitalist relations of production, whether 
directly in agriculture through input supply mar-
kets or sales of produce, or in the broader sense 
of being locked into a cash economy to meet at 
least some of their needs.
The large-scale commercial farming sector domi-
nates production of agricultural commodities, 
both for the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ segments 
of the agro-food system. The corporate seg-
ment of the agro-food system relies on a stable 
supply base of commercial farmers (Bienabe & 
Vermeulen 2007). Concentration in agricultural 
production has increased since deregulation and 
liberalisation. While the amount of land under 
agricultural production has remained constant 
across all sectors, the number of commercial farm 
units has dropped from 60 000 in the early 1990s 
to about 40 000, indicating a concentration of 
land ownership (National Department of Agri-
culture 2009:6; Statistics South Africa 2009:10). A 
small core of 6% of farm units produced 40% of 
total income in the mid-1980s (Cooper 1988:53). 
This concentration increased in the period af-
ter deregulation and liberalisation. In 2002, 673 
farmers (about 1.6%) produced a third of gross 
farm income, and fewer than 2 500 (about 6%) 
produced more than half of gross income (Sher-
ry 2010a: 47). In the red meat sector, although 
small farmers held between 30% and 40% of the 
national herd in the early parts of this decade, 
a small number of large-scale feedlots account 
for up to 60% of the total number of animals 
slaughtered each year (Food Pricing Monitoring 
Committee 2004:173, 175). In sugar, the trend has 
been for the minimum-sized unit on which com-
mercial farmers can make a living to increase 
(Cartwright et al. 2005). Although the industry 
boasts 51 000 small-scale African growers, these 
contract farmers only contribute around 15–17% 
of harvested cane. Most of these cane growers 
are men. A comparatively small number (around 
2 000) of large-scale growers accounted for over 
70% of total cane harvested at the start of this 
decade (Maloa 2001:2). In the dairy sector, lib-
eralisation brought consolidation in agricultural 
production, with the top 5% of producers ac-
counting for 24% of production in 2001, com-
pared with 10% in 1995. This is partly the result 
of processors forcing prices down, stimulating 
consolidation of production units (Mather & 
Kenny 2005). Apart from dominating the corpo-
rate supply chain, these large-scale commercial 
producers also have a direct impact on ‘non-cor-
porate’ food markets through sales of produce 
onto fresh produce markets (both regional and 
local) or into smaller channels of distribution 
in the form of direct sales. Small producers are 
thereby forced into direct competition with the 
large-scale commercial producers, even when 
they are not involved in value chains that end 
with corporate retailers. Transaction costs in 
supply chains favour larger farms, small produc-
ers are often constrained from making the nec-
essary investments to participate in the supply 
chain, and small farms require more assistance 
than larger farms per unit of output (Swinnen 
2007). However, small farms pose fewer prob-
lems for the contracting company in contract en-
forcement, and may have cost advantages over 
larger farms (Swinnen 2007).
Employment on large commercial farms has 
dropped substantially over the past decade as 
producers have consolidated and sought to cut 
costs, and responded to legislation to secure ten-
ure and institute minimum wages. From a peak 
of over 1.6 million workers (permanent and tem-
porary) in 1970, the number of workers had de-
clined to 600 000 by 2005 (National Department 
of Agriculture 2009:4). According to the 2007 
Agricultural Survey, there were 432 000 full-time 
workers and 365 000 seasonal workers in that 
year (Statistics South Africa 2009:5). Key shifts in 
the labour market include substitution of perma-
nent labour with temporary and casual labour, 
increased use of labour contracting, and an in-
crease in the number of female farm workers 
(but in less secure forms of employment) (Vink 
& van Rooyen 2009). Very little systematic work 
has been done on the conditions of labourers on 
small-scale farms. One view is that the exploi-
tation of household (mainly women and child) 
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labour and the underpayment of wage labour 
underpin the better per hectare productivity of 
smallholder farming. No full survey has been 
conducted, but anecdotal evidence, or evidence 
from research in specific localities, indicates that 
agricultural workers on small-scale farms are 
often not paid or otherwise paid very poorly – 
certainly below the minimum wage – and condi-
tions are not regulated by the state.9
Despite their marginality to the corporate sys-
tem, smallholders play a minor but important 
role in the overall food system. Just 3.7% of the 
income of small-scale non-metropolitan house-
holds with access to land comes from sales of ag-
ricultural produce (Vink & van Rooyen 2009:14). 
However, 78% engage in agricultural produc-
tion as an extra source of food for the household 
and another 8% have agricultural production as 
their main source of household food (Vink & van 
Rooyen 2009:15). These producers could form a 
potential platform for an entirely different struc-
ture of agricultural production. In conditions of 
high, structural unemployment, supporting and 
extending this production base may produce 
favourable results. The government is reorient-
ing towards smallholders, in rhetoric if not prac-
tice, following the ANC’s Polokwane conference 
resolutions in 2007. These resolutions not only 
moved rural development and agrarian reform 
higher up the agenda, but also shifted the agri-
cultural focus to smallholders (African National 
Congress 2007). The subsequent Comprehen-
sive Rural Development Programme identified 
categories similar to those proposed by Cousins 
(2009) above, but hasn’t yet made it clear which 
are the priority groups for support. Resources 
to realise the shift in practice are also severely 
constrained. Smallholder producers – especially 
new entrants – are forced to compete with well-
entrenched large-scale commercial producers, 
with limited external support. The land reform 
programme (through LRAD, or Land Reform for 
Agricultural Development) is lagging behind the 
more recent developments, still emphasising the 
transfer of large-scale commercial farms to in-
dividuals or households. There is no indication 
yet from government that it will move in the 
direction of subdividing large farms once they 
have been redistributed. So far, talk is limited 
to individual ownership of production units and 
a land ceiling set high. Despite the land reform 
programme, there is a strong indication that ac-
cess to land for farming is declining. Between 
2002 and 2006, the number of households in 
South Africa with access to land for farming 
declined by 21%. In relative terms, the number 
of households with land access fell from 15.7% 
of all households to 10.7%, with the largest loss 
experienced by those with the smallest parcels 
of land (Vink & van Rooyen 2009:14). Change 
in ownership, both of land and business, is an 
important factor in shifting power in the agro-
food system.
Contract farming is a key part of the agro-food 
system. This is not limited to smallholder con-
tract ‘schemes’, and includes large-scale com-
mercial producers. The relationship between 
agents in industrial–corporate chains is increas-
ingly through contract agreements and rarely in-
volves open market transactions (Mather 2005). 
Vermeulen et al. (2008) show how procurement 
through contracts is common between retailers 
and producers as well as processors and produc-
ers in fresh fruit and vegetables; potatoes, maize 
and peanuts for the snack industry; eggs, poultry 
and meat; and tobacco, sugar cane, cotton and 
timber. Contracts vary from one-year  production 
agreements to ten-year agreements (2008:208–
9). Retailers prefer to contract with those who 
are able to meet their quality standards with 
consistency of supply and at required volumes 
(Reardon 2006), the latter of which raises barri-
ers to entry for small-scale producers regardless 
of how efficient they are.
It is difficult for smallholders to compete with 
large-scale commercial producers, especially 
in staple crops like grains where economies of 
scale are significant. One result is an orienta-
tion to high-value niche products, such as fresh 
fruit and vegetables or organic or Fair Trade 
products which trade at a premium. Contract 
schemes organised through centralised process-
ing units – especially in cotton, poultry, tobacco, 
timber and sugar cane – are a way of organis-
ing the involvement of smallholders into cor-
porate value chains. Some of them were previ-
ously state run but others, such as sugar, were 
always co-ordinated by the private sector. Given 
global competition, the production of some of 
these crops, for example cotton, is in long-term 
decline. Smallholder contract farming for cor-
porate processors is not always beneficial to the 
producers. The contracted grower lends to the 
production process labour power and the prop-
erty within their possession (Watts 1994b). ‘The 
peasant “content” of contracting cannot…be 
taken for granted, since the smallholder may, 
in some cases, be little more than a rhetorical 
device to legitimate large-scale…investment’ 
9  Data forthcoming from 
a PLAAS study of livelihoods 
after land reform conducted by 
Aliber, Greenberg and others 
in Limpopo in 2008/9, as an 
example.
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(Watts 1994b:57) for the purposes of capital ac-
cumulation. The contract allows capital to locate 
sources of accumulation without directly taking 
hold of the point of agricultural production, dis-
tributing the production risks to direct producers 
but controlling the process through appropria-
tion (Watts 1994a). Concretely, contract farming 
for resource-poor small-scale farmers is often ac-
companied by decreased food production and 
an increase in food insecurity as a result of con-
centration on contract crops (Kirsten & Sartorius 
2002). Small-scale contract farmers may also find 
it difficult to make any income from agriculture, 
even in comparatively wealthy sectors such as 
sugar. As an example, a third of small-scale con-
tract cane growers did not make any returns in 
the 2004 season (Cartwright et al. 2005:22). 
Input supply
Transnational companies dominate input sup-
ply. The chain connects to the minerals-energy 
complex through agrochemicals and, increasing-
ly, seed (mixed local companies and transnation-
als) and machinery and equipment manufacture 
(mainly transnational, indicating the historical 
weakness of South Africa’s capital equipment 
manufacturing sector). Expenditure on fuel rose 
steeply from around R5–6 billion in 2005–7 to 
more than R13 billion in 2008. Fertiliser prices 
also rose dramatically from around R3 billion 
in 2005 to over R8 billion in 2008 (National De-
partment of Agriculture 2008:5). More than R7.5 
billion was spent on machinery and implements 
in 2008, up from R3.5 billion in 2005 (National 
Department of Agriculture 2008:8). These sharp 
increases show both the rapid growth in agricul-
tural commodity prices over that period, which 
led farmers to expand their asset base, but 
also the sharp increase in the costs of oil-based 
products. South Africa’s high level of imports of 
agricultural inputs exposes producers to sharp 
fluctuations in price and to price rises as the pro-
duction of raw materials cannot keep pace with 
rapid economic growth.
Following deregulation, the South African fer-
tiliser industry was rationalised and there was a 
shift to imports of raw materials (African Centre 
for Biosafety 2009). Two local producers and one 
multinational dominate the supply of intermedi-
ate and final products to the market. A high lev-
el of concentration in the fertiliser production 
industry has led to anticompetitive behaviour. 
In 2009, the Competition Tribunal found Sasol, 
Omnia and Yara/Kynoch guilty of cartel conduct 
in the supply of nitrogenous fertiliser, and Sasol 
and Foskor guilty of cartel conduct in the sup-
ply of phosphoric acid. Sasol had to pay a fine 
of R250 million (Competition Tribunal 2009). 
Foskor, which produces phosphoric acid, a key 
ingredient in fertiliser, was found to have con-
travened the Competition Act by entering into 
a ‘toll production’ agreement with Sasol which 
constituted a division of markets between the 
two (Njobeni 2010).
The agrochemical and seed sectors are also 
concentrated, especially in some key crops (for 
example, maize and wheat). All the big global 
biotech seed companies are deeply involved in 
the agrochemical sector. Bayer tops the list, fol-
lowed by Dow, Sygenta, BASF, Monsanto and Du 
Pont (African Centre for Biosafety 2009:52). In 
the seed sector, Pannar (a company with South 
African origins and now a target for takeover by 
Du Pont-Pioneer Hi-Bred) and Monsanto hold 
32% of registered seed cultivars between them 
(African Centre for Biosafety 2009:45). The par-
astatal Agricultural Research Council (ARC) holds 
8.6%. The top ten companies control more than 
two-thirds of registered varieties (African Cen-
tre for Biosafety 2009:42). Pannar, Monsanto, 
Du Pont-Pioneer and Afgri (also local, emerging 
from the old Oos-Transvaal Ko-op in Mpuma-
langa) dominate GM seed varieties. GM seeds 
dominate seed use in the maize sector: 56% of 
the total area planted to white maize and 72% 
of yellow maize were GM seed varieties in 2008 
(Nel 2009; Sansor 2009:11). Other than that, GM 
seed is restricted to two small commodity sec-
tors, cotton and soya. 
A large number of non-GM varieties still exist for 
the crops for which GM varieties are also availa-
ble. Although there are more hybrid varieties in 
maize, sunflower and grain sorghum, open pol-
linated varieties (OPVs) are dominant in all other 
crops. These seed varieties are available even if 
they are not the most commercially used varie-
ties. Production of certified seed is outsourced, 
with larger farmers producing hybrid seed and 
smaller farmers producing OPVs (African Centre 
for Biosafety 2009). On-farm seed saving is an-
other option that is practised where OPVs are 
used. With hybrids and GM seeds, loss of vigour 
and legal prohibition limit on-farm saving. As 
a result, as the corporate sector expands, op-
portunities for the diverse production of seed 
diminish. However, the combination of OPVs 
produced commercially by smallholder farmers 
or, alternatively, saved on the farm by producers 
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for re-use signals a potential point of interven-
tion for more ecologically sustainable seed pro-
duction, as well as a potentially larger role for 
smallholder farmers in producing seed. Coupled 
with the ARC’s important public ownership of 
many seed varieties, there is a good possibility 
for public action to strengthen non-corporate 
seed production.
State-run extension services are very thin on 
the ground, and staff are poorly trained. Exten-
sion workers tend to be accountable to private 
or public bureaucracies. A solution proposed 
by government and large-scale agribusiness is 
to have farmers pay for extension services and 
to encourage competition between extension 
workers for business – in essence, to privatise the 
service. In practice, this has reproduced a dual 
system where those who can afford extension 
services have a strong and accountable service 
(driven by money), and those who cannot afford 
it have no service or a very poor public service. 
It is the same reproduction that cuts across all 
facets of the South African economy and society, 
whether it is education, security, water and elec-
tricity access or food provisioning. The model re-
produces this split between an elite minority and 
an impoverished majority.
The ‘market’ has stepped in only where it is prof-
itable, for example in fresh produce, or only in 
segments of chains, as in poultry contract pro-
duction where selected producers are given 
both state and corporate support to produce for 
a corporate processor to the exclusion of others. 
Even public extension workers often end up be-
ing transmission agents for corporate seed and 
agrochemical companies. Corporations provide 
‘training’ to extension officers in the use of their 
products and then use government extension 
workers to go out and sell their products. A radi-
cal retooling of extension services is required, 
including a transformed curriculum that ena-
bles them to provide technical advice based on 
sound ecological practices (that is, using natural 
resources renewably). In addition, connections 
between producers and resources/support need 
to be facilitated, as does the organisation of pro-
ducers. This may be a tall order in the context of 
the limited priority in government budgets for 
agricultural support.
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Corporation % share
Sasol 18.43
Tiger Foods 14.69
Woolworths Holdings 13.96
Spar 13.6
Shoprite Holdings 12.32
Massmart 11.35
Astral Foods 11.12
Pick n Pay 8.8
Table 1: Selected PIC investments in agro-food corporations, 
2009
Sources: Pick n Pay (2009), Public Investment Corporation (2009:80)
Arguably, the conditions for heterarchic forms 
of governance are not sufficiently developed in 
South Africa to allow for ‘inter-systemic steering’ 
to transcend market and hierarchical forms of 
governance. There are high levels of distrust be-
tween government and corporations, and these 
often have racial overtones. The state has ceded 
a lot of ground to private control through the 
processes of deregulation and liberalisation ini-
tiated in the 1970s, with the restructuring reach-
ing its apex with the passing of the Marketing of 
Agricultural Products Act in 1996. But the state 
has also imposed new regulations that rely quite 
heavily on self-regulation by private agents. The 
weakness of the state manifests in its inability to 
realise some of its policies, especially its inability 
to monitor and enforce compliance. At the same 
time, state regulations underpin private co-ordi-
nation and governance of value chains. Below, 
four areas of ‘meta-governance’ are considered: 
consumer protection, labour regulations, com-
petition policy, and Agricultural Black Economic 
Empowerment (AgriBEE). Each of these shapes 
the boundaries within with private actors can 
self-regulate.
The government is interlocked with corporate 
capital in another sense. Eighty-nine percent of 
the Public Investment Corporation’s (PIC’s) in-
vestment capital is held on behalf of the Gov-
ernment Employees Pension Fund. It holds sig-
nificant shares in companies throughout the 
agro-food system (Table 1). This certainly makes 
it more difficult for government to consider a 
radical transformation of the agro-food system 
that would reduce corporate value and profit-
ability. Government has chosen which invest-
ments to make. In the 1990s, the idea of pre-
scribed assets was floated, which would require 
a portion of all investments to be made in social 
infrastructure. There is still a return, but it might 
not necessarily be as high as returns from the 
most profitable corporate enterprises. The Con-
gress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU 
2010)  raised the idea again in its draft policies 
on a new growth path.
Consumer protection
Focusing as it does on the structural functioning 
of commodity chains, the value chain approach 
tends to downplay the role of individual actors 
or their existence as active agents who shape 
their reality, even if this is in conditions not of 
their own choosing. This includes the structure 
and functioning of commodity chains which, if 
broken down, can be seen as a series of social 
interactions with real people involved. Although 
these actors are constrained by past structure, 
they simultaneously reproduce and alter that 
structure every day in their social interactions. 
There is always space for change. Yet ‘consumers 
emerge as private, atomistic and passive rather 
than being “eminently social, relational and ac-
State interventions in the 
governance structure
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tive”’ (Goodman 2009:17, paraphrasing Appa-
durai). This goes not only for consumers but for 
active human agents throughout the agro-food 
system (which includes everyone, because every-
body needs food to survive). In their everyday 
activities, people construct the ‘fetishised’ (un-
acknowledged, given a permanent status even 
if they are transitory) commodity relationships 
and their meanings. Breaking this ‘commodity 
dream’ requires conscious, collective activity.
Across the board, consumers are poorly organ-
ised to represent their own interests as consum-
ers of food products. There are some NGO con-
sumer protection bodies like the South African 
National Consumers Union and the National 
Consumer Forum, but they operate without an 
organised mass constituency. The government is 
well aware of the weakness of consumers and 
has put some far-reaching policies and laws in 
place although, as with other laws and policies, 
its capacity for monitoring and enforcement is 
questionable. Part of the problem is that en-
forcement of consumer rights is scattered across 
numerous regulatory agencies and systems, with 
limited co-ordination.
The most recent law is the Consumer Protection 
Act No. 68 of 2008 (CPA), passed by the Presi-
dency, which came into force in October 2010. 
The Act creates a number of consumer rights 
and establishes a National Consumer Commis-
sion to investigate and rule on consumer com-
plaints based on these rights. Section 61.1 of the 
Act places liability on producers, importers, dis-
tributors and retailers for: a) supplying any un-
safe goods; b) defects or hazards in any goods; c) 
inadequate warnings provided to the consumer 
pertaining to hazards arising from or associated 
with the use of any goods.10 Consumers will be 
able to claim compensation for harm suffered in 
respect of any such goods supplied after 24 April 
2010 if they can prove that the supplier supplied 
the goods to them and that they suffered harm 
as a result of using the goods. This means all ac-
tors in the value chain can be held liable. Suppli-
ers will not be able to contract out of product 
liability any more (McGee 2010). Retailers must 
deal with consumer complaints and will not be 
permitted to refer the consumer to suppliers 
(Luterek 2009). Nevertheless, this liability is lim-
ited in section 61(4)(c), which says liability does 
not arise if ‘it is unreasonable to expect the dis-
tributor or retailer to have discovered the unsafe 
product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, 
having regard to that person’s role in marketing 
the goods to consumers’. This means consumers 
will probably have to make claims against man-
ufacturers or importers rather than retailers or 
distributors, unless product testing was possible 
at the retail level (Woker 2009).
The terms of the CPA potentially impose the ne-
cessity of product segregation in the value chain 
for GM crops in South Africa (maize, soya, cot-
ton), but especially maize and soya since they 
mainly go into the human food supply. Costs 
of segregation and identity preservation are 
unevenly distributed across the chain and may 
force changes in supply chain structure, includ-
ing smaller, more decentralised storage and 
grain handling facilities. There are low premi-
ums for non-GM maize and soya although there 
is a niche market of high-premium products. 
Product segregation requires mandatory label-
ling and monitoring, which are not yet in place 
but could potentially be included into CPA regu-
lations due to be passed shortly early 2011. This 
has implications for retailers in supply chain gov-
ernance and brings product traceability into the 
mainstream (African Centre for Biosafety 2010).
Labour regulations
Labour regulations throughout the chain have 
had uneven effects. They are also unevenly mon-
itored and enforced. The Labour Relations Act 
and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act are 
applicable throughout the chain, and minimum 
wages are in place in some parts of the chain. 
In agriculture, the average wage for all workers 
(including white collar workers, who are paid 
far more than blue collar workers in this sector) 
was just slightly higher than the minimum wage 
in 2007. The minimum wage currently stands at 
R1 232/month for permanent workers. National 
statistics on farm wages are very weak. They are 
gathered too seldom, are not disaggregated 
enough, and rely on voluntary returns for their 
information. The latest Agricultural Census (Sta-
tistics South Africa 2009:19) shows that full-time 
workers earned an average wage of R1 384.83/
month in 2007. This was down from R1 500.32 
in 2005 (Statistics South Africa 2006: 10). Casu-
al and seasonal workers earned an average of 
R328.15/month (with seasonality taken into ac-
count) from farm work in 2007, compared with 
R354.56/month in 2005. Conditions vary accord-
ing to the size of the production unit, with big-
ger units tending towards better conditions. 
10  This section was drawn from 
African Centre for Biosafety 
(2010).
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Casualisation and outsourcing, as noted above, 
are key trends. Unionisation is very low, with 
small pockets of independent organisation. The 
Food and Allied Workers’ Union (FAWU) organ-
ises mainly on corporate or state-owned farms 
that are closely integrated with processing, such 
as timber or sugar cane.
In retail, the historically strong South African 
Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union 
(SACCAWU) has some level of organisation, but 
is battling to deal with high levels of casualisa-
tion and subcontracting of workers (Kenny 2001). 
In processing/manufacturing, FAWU organises at 
one of labour’s stronger points in the agro-food 
system, with an emphasis on larger corporate 
entities. However, jobs in some sectors such as 
canning were destroyed with trade liberalisa-
tion. Both FAWU and SACCAWU are COSATU af-
filiates. FAWU has called for the speeding up of 
land redistribution and agrarian reform, which 
signals that the union is beginning to think 
about the food system more broadly. Anti-union 
practices (including subcontracting, outsourcing 
and labour broking) are quite widespread, even 
at the corporate retail level. Wal-Mart – possibly 
to enter the South African retail market shortly 
– has a reputation for being anti-union (Bleby 
2010c).
Initiatives such as the Ethical Trading Initiative 
and Fairtrade seek to secure compliance with 
minimum labour legislation, which is a form 
of securing a portion of value for workers that 
they might not otherwise get, mainly in export 
products going to European supermarkets. They 
focus on enforcing international or national la-
bour standards in the production process, and 
on ecologically sustainable production tech-
niques. However, they fail to deal with the low 
prices supermarkets offer, and hence transfer 
added costs to suppliers and others upstream 
(du Toit 2009). Pick n Pay is seeking to establish 
a Fairtrade market in South Africa, and claims 
that 16 000 farm workers and small-scale farm-
ers benefited from the introduction of Fairtrade 
products in its stores in 2009 (Bleby 2010a: 2).
Regulation of competition
The Competition Commission has played a very 
important role in raising awareness of the gov-
ernance and functioning of agro-food supply 
chains. Together with the National Agricultural 
Marketing Council, they have put together an 
impressive list of detailed investigations and re-
ports. They are both government institutions. 
The Competition Commission has some teeth. It 
recently imposed a R196 million fine on Pioneer 
for its role in a bread cartel, and was taking for-
ward action to make the fine a percentage of 
the whole group’s turnover rather than just the 
food division’s. This would amount to R1.6 billion 
(Mathe 2010: 11). Hot on the heels of fines for 
price fixing in bread manufacturing, the Com-
mission is investigating Pioneer Foods, Foodcorp 
(trading as Ruto Mills), Godrich Milling, Premier 
Foods and Tiger Brands for colluding to establish 
a mechanism for fixing prices and dividing the 
market between them (Mathe 2010). In 2009, 
the Competition Tribunal found Sasol, Omnia 
and Yara/Kynoch guilty of cartel conduct in the 
supply of nitrogenous fertiliser, and Sasol and 
Foskor guilty of cartel conduct in the supply of 
phosphoric acid. Sasol had to pay a fine of R250 
million (Competition Tribunal 2009: 13). It was 
also ordered to divest from some of its fertiliser 
assets (Gedye 2010). 
Competition policy does constrain some private 
sector efforts at self-interested chain govern-
ance. For example, in the Sasol case, it was con-
sidered collusion for companies to sit together in 
committees to:
co-ordinate business practices and goals; ex-
change information about production, sup-
ply and demand; allocate, redistribute and 
swop sales by reference to sales targets, pre-
vailing market shares and product availabil-
ity; and agree on export volumes and prices, 
directly or indirectly fixing prices; dividing 
markets by allocating customers, suppliers or 
specific types of goods (Competition Tribunal 
2009:6). 
However, charging high prices is not enough to 
put competition authorities on the alert. Only if 
a monopoly engages in predatory or exclusion-
ary behaviour does this become an issue (Gold-
smith 2001). But the South African Commission 
is making an active intervention in the market, 
in the same way as the PIC recently embraced 
shareholder activism to shake up corporate gov-
ernance, with some success. PIC is the largest 
holder of capital in the country, a mix of shares 
bought with pension funds. It has certainly 
stepped back from its overtly interventionist role 
in the past year or so – in the same time frames 
as the Zuma administration came in. So there 
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are mixed signals from the central state about 
levels of intervention in corporate structure. This 
brings us to AgriBEE, which has a far more ex-
plicitly transformative role than the Competition 
Commission.
AgriBEE
The AgriBEE framework was released in 2004, 
and a sector charter gazetted in 2008, to in-
crease the involvement of the under-represent-
ed in agriculture in the corporate commodity 
chain, from input supply to processing (National 
Department of Agriculture 2006a). For its pur-
poses, then, retail is treated separately. The 
Charter identifies seven areas of empowerment: 
ownership; management control; employment 
equity; skills development; preferential procure-
ment; enterprise development; and rural devel-
opment, poverty alleviation and corporate social 
investment (National Department of Agricul-
ture 2006a). The AgriBEE scorecard establishes 
a number of specific targets, for example 25% 
of equity ownership; 40% participation in senior 
top management; 2% of leviable amount spent 
on skills development; 1.5% spent on corporate 
social investment (National Department of Agri-
culture 2006b).
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Practical bases for 
transforming the agro-food 
system
A survey conducted by the Agricultural Busi-
ness Chamber and the Industrial Development 
Corporation (an investment parastatal) showed 
that respondents to the survey have focused 
their efforts on the socio-economic and skills 
development aspects of BEE. Similar results on 
priority areas were found in a survey of the dairy 
industry in the Western and Eastern Cape (Busi-
ness Report 2008). These are more related to im-
proving workers’ conditions and skill levels. Spe-
cific measures are put in place in the scorecard 
(National Department of Agriculture 2006b). It 
is hard to tell whether there are guidelines be-
yond the scorecard, or if a transparent and cred-
ible process of verification is in place or is being 
built. For example, measuring skills development 
progress on the basis of the quantifiable meas-
ure of ‘2% of leviable amount spent on skills 
development’ ignores the major bureaucratic 
snarl-ups in setting up a network of approved 
skills providers. Because of the general lack of 
certain corporate-specific skills in the society, 
skills providers are not likely to be in any better 
shape – and that means importing skills in cor-
porate production techniques. Only some of the 
bigger entities will take seriously the need for a 
change in the racial composition of ownership. 
The primary incentive for private companies 
to abide by the AgriBEE Charter is preferential 
procurement, with the state using its power as 
a purchaser of goods and services to promote 
BEE. Thus, in input supply, agricultural produc-
tion and food processing, BEE is an example of 
a case where the state is using its institutional 
power to attempt to intervene to strengthen 
non-corporate actors in agro-food chains at the 
expense of corporations that are not compli-
ant. Some large companies recognise this and 
have made changes in the racial composition of 
ownership. Examples of the BEE deals that have 
taken place in agriculture are the R323 million 
transfer of Boschendal wine estate, Phetego In-
vestments’ 25.1% acquisition in KWV, the sale of 
a 15% stake in Distell’s South African Distilleries 
and Wines to a BEE consortium, the R502 mil-
lion sale of a 26.77% stake in Afgri Operations 
to Agri Sizwe Empowerment Trust (which was 
opposed by FAWU for its unequal distribution of 
benefits), Country Foods’ sale of 4% of shares to 
Kagiso Trust for R5.5 million, and the acquisition 
of a 30% stake in exporter Afrifresh Group by 
Vuwa Investments (headed by Bulelani Ngcuka). 
Contract farming with black smallholders is also 
being presented as an economic empowerment 
model in the poultry, sugar and other sectors.
The agro-food system has been restructured 
but these changes have not led to significantly 
greater diversity anywhere along the chain. 
Corporate control has strengthened and there 
is increased concentration of corporate owner-
ship. Support to black and smaller enterprises 
to enable them to break into industrial value 
chains has been sporadic. The Congress Alliance 
has placed renewed emphasis on questions of 
transformation of agro-food value chains in re-
cent years, although this has not yet translated 
into a fundamental shift in their orientation 
towards agriculture and transformation of the 
agro-food system. The ANC’s Polokwane resolu-
tions recognised that concentration and vertical 
integration in the value chain limit the space for 
smallholders to participate in the market. The 
ANC  proposed ‘to integrate small holders into 
formal value chains and link them with markets’ 
(African National Congress 2007: page). Howev-
er, the proposals are silent on the details on how 
this might happen. Linking smallholder farmers 
into existing industrial commodity chains may 
offer some advantages for individuals (depend-
ing on how it is structured), but it doesn’t alter 
the broader relations of power in the agro-food 
system as a whole. From what can be seen in 
practice, the scale remains at the level of small 
pilots or boutique projects rather than a mass-
scale reorientation.
The ANC government has passed legislation sup-
porting co-operatives as a key organisational 
form to realise the integration of smallholders 
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into industrial commodity chains. The AgriBEE 
framework extends to beneficiation, storage, 
distribution and trading of agricultural com-
modities (National Department of Agriculture 
2006a). COSATU (2010) has also called for sup-
port to co-ops throughout the agro-food chain. 
The government has put some effort into build-
ing co-ops in the agricultural sector in the past 
few years. Primary co-ops in agricultural produc-
tion have grouped individuals together to work 
collectively on commodity production. Second-
ary co-ops concentrate on downstream inter-
mediation, mainly to facilitate access to markets 
and to collective processing facilities. Sometimes 
processing may be run by parastatals such as 
ARC, but at other times the co-ops help to fa-
cilitate access into corporate markets. On the 
input supply end, the emphasis is less on co-ops 
and more on constructing state-driven facilities 
for renting equipment. This is still at the plan-
ning stage in many places. Co-ops can enable 
small-scale producers to get input discounts on 
the basis of economies of scale, or find ways into 
industrial value chains (supermarkets or process-
ing facilities) by pooling their produce – but even 
in COSATU, thinking has not gone beyond this 
(see COSATU 2010). However, these efforts are 
constrained by the overall market dominance of 
large-scale commercial producers in agro-food 
chains. As a result, co-ops are unable to respond 
effectively to the concentration of control in the 
value chain either upstream or downstream of 
production.
COSATU (2010) has proposed  far greater state 
intervention in the agro-food system, including 
developing industrial policy that orients towards 
producing capital goods for agricultural pro-
duction and processing, regulating food prices, 
maintaining grain stocks, zero rating staple 
foods, restricting speculative activity on food 
and establishing state-owned food processing, 
procurement and distribution enterprises across 
food chains. It is worth considering the direction 
COSATU proposes, since it has the greatest ca-
pacity of any organised formation in South Af-
rica to mobilise masses of people in support of 
its demands. However, COSATU’s policy propos-
als essentially constitute a long wish list with al-
most no concrete proposals about how this will 
be achieved or who is going to do it.
The South African Communist Party has also 
weighed in on farm workers and land and agrar-
ian reform in recent years (Nzimande 2004a, b). 
A small group of land rights NGOs has also built 
links with small farmer groups to try to develop 
an agenda based on ecologically and socially sus-
tainable agriculture. However, not much think-
ing has been done about broader transforma-
tion in the agro-food system or in specific com-
modity chains. Of course, this can’t all happen at 
once, especially if the process is being driven by 
small farmer groups who are still struggling to 
make productive use of the land. 
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Possible points of 
intervention
Overall, none of the practical activities that seek 
to transform agro-food systems engage with the 
idea of value chain governance, or currently per-
ceive it as a useful entry point into transforma-
tion. This may be because it is not an issue pres-
ently confronting them and their constituencies. 
Some corporations, especially in retail, may be 
trying to improve certain aspects of governance. 
This is generally being considered as part of their 
ongoing pursuit to improve efficiencies, thus cre-
ating added value which they will seek to secure 
for themselves as far as possible. It thus appears 
that there are no social forces currently capable 
of and willing to transform agro-food systems by 
engaging with their forms of governance.
However, if we took as our starting point the 
idea of a campaign in one particular commod-
ity chain in South Africa, we might be able to 
lay out a series of questions that could flesh out 
the content of such a campaign. Let’s consider 
either the wheat to bread chain or the maize 
chain or possibly poultry, since these are prob-
ably the most important commodity chains for 
the poor in South Africa. Such a campaign could 
involve a range of different actors: government 
departments, farmer organisations, the Compe-
tition Commission, trade unions, NGOs and even 
corporations. We can travel through the value 
chain, stopping at each point of value addition 
and asking questions that a campaign would 
seek to respond to. Let’s start at input supply: 
what opportunities are there to use OPV seeds 
owned by public institutions? Can smallholder 
farmers be involved in producing these seeds 
within the formal certification system? Are 
there smallholders who are interested in doing 
this? What resources would they require to al-
low them to produce at the appropriate quality 
standards? What is the possibility of acquiring 
these resources, even on a ‘pilot’ scale to begin 
with (for example, irrigation or extension servic-
es)? How could these farmers be organised to in-
teract with public seed-holding institutions like 
the ARC? What are the possibilities of producing 
quality certified seed in an ecologically sustain-
able way? What kind of collective arrangements 
can be made to enable the seed producers to ac-
quire other necessary inputs at the most favour-
able prices? What kind of relationship can be 
established between land owners and workers 
on the land that allows for an equitable sharing 
of benefits from the enterprise?
Once the seed is produced and supplied to the 
farmers who will grow it, a similar set of ques-
tions will be asked. With regard to linking 
smallholder producers to agro-processing, what 
are the possibilities of localising storage and 
processing? Are there activities already hap-
pening in the locality in this regard, and what 
would be required to scale them up? If there are 
no local processing activities, is there an interest 
among individuals or groups to do this? What 
role would there be for government, CSI, and 
inhabitants of that locality in establishing and 
running such an enterprise? What are the pos-
sibilities of farmers co-operating to establish fa-
cilities under their own control? How can labour 
conditions in agro-processing be improved, and 
will the enterprise be economically feasible? If 
not, what would be required for farmers to take 
their produce to existing storage and process-
ing facilities? What organisational forms might 
allow them to secure the best prices for their 
products?
What physical markets exist locally for the sale 
of food products? How can these markets be 
supported to improve the quality of their serv-
ice to buyers, including food safety and environ-
mental health? Jayne (2008) has proposed that 
these might include decongestion, sanitation, 
safety and the provision of infrastructure such 
as loading points. What do stall holders or sell-
ers require to improve their working conditions? 
What resources can be tapped into to realise 
these? If local markets are inappropriate chan-
nels for the distribution of the products, what 
do producers need to do to gain access to gen-
eral dealers or supermarkets? What changes 
might be made in supermarkets’ procurement 
policies to enable access for smallholder farm-
ers and food processors? What government 
procurement schemes exist in the area, for ex-
ample school feeding schemes, or provisions for 
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hospitals or military barracks? Is there room for 
negotiation to enable smallholders to provide 
at least part of the food requirements for these 
conduits? Does AgriBEE provide an opportunity 
to adapt government’s food procurement strat-
egies in support of its broader objectives?  What 
organisational forms would be most appropriate 
for this?
This list of questions indicates the numerous 
points at which interventions can be made. They 
will be most effective if they are done in combi-
nation, thus revealing the complexity of realis-
ing change in the agro-food system. It is possi-
ble to try to answer each of these by suggesting 
what could or should be done in each instance. 
Specific circumstances will determine the inter-
ventions that are appropriate.
From a governance point of view, this poses 
difficult questions. Since the state and corpora-
tions are both involved in different aspects of 
chain governance, and since these aspects differ 
from commodity to commodity, there can be no 
overarching recommendations about how gov-
ernance should be adjusted to orient industrial 
commodity chains in the interests of the poor. Al-
though the state has produced laws and policies 
that establish boundaries within which private 
regulation and action can take place, it does not 
have the capacity to monitor or enforce most of 
these laws. The private sector is able to perform 
some regulatory functions of its own, but mainly 
in its own interest. Focusing on practical activity 
in a particular commodity chain, and drawing in 
those who are necessary for the process, as well 
as those who are able to make a contribution, 
may widen the scope of those involved in gov-
ernance. In this process, interventions that are 
currently piecemeal (like creating producer co-
ops without considering how they link to proc-
esses elsewhere in the commodity chain) might 
become more integrated. Different actors can 
take responsibility for segments of the process, 
although some overall co-ordination will be re-
quired. Who can and will provide that remains 
an open question.
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